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Abstract:  This paper describes a new approach used by Hydro-Québec to determine the rules of 
automatic devices installed in its main power plants to maintain secure operation under extreme 
contingencies. An example of application of this approach is given to illustrate how to apply data mining 
technique for the rules of the automatic generator rejection and remote load shedding system (RPTC: Rejet 
de Production et Télédélestage de Charges in French) installed at the Churchill Falls hydroelectric power 
plant (5500 MW) in Labrador. Real time snapshots of the Hydro-Québec power system collected over 
several years data have been used to generate large amounts of results (database) by transient stability 
simulations. The database is processed by the data mining software developed by the University of Liege 
to construct the decision trees. This approach gives the most relevant parameters and finds optimal settings 
for the RPTC system at the Churchill Falls, minimizing the number of generator rejection while 




Keywords: Protection systems - Automatisms - Dynamic Security - Risk - Data Mining - Stability.  
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The operation criteria  [1] at Hydro-Quebec 
require that the power system remains stable 
without any assistance of Special Protection 
Systems (SPS) following normal contingencies 
(Table i) [2]. These normal contingencies are hence 
used to determine the secure transfer limits for the 
various corridors of the system, in compliance with 
the Northeast Power Coordinating Council 
(NPCC) criteria. 
 
In addition to these requirements, Hydro-Québec 
considers that it is also important for the system to remain stable after certain extreme contingencies (Table 
i) [2]. The system stability is maintained by Special Protection Systems. According to the event and the 
configuration of the power system, the special protection system – the RPTC system (“Rejet de Production 
et Télé délestage de Charge” in French) activates the generator rejection and remote load shedding 
scheme. Figure 1 gives an overview of the basic structure and the general operation of the RPTC system. 
RPTC systems are installed in fifteen 735 kV substations of the Hydro-Québec system. The subsystems in 
a same corridor (or main axis) are combined into an independent group. There are a total of 4 groups 
shown in dark shaded areas in Figure 1. Each group of RPTC systems performs, associated with 
independent Special Protection Systems, the generation rejection scheme at one particular generation site 
while the remote load shedding function is centralized.  
Table i: Normal and extreme contingencies 
Three phase fault with normal clearing 
Single line to ground fault with delayed clearing 
Breaker fault with normal clearing 
Loss of a bipolar dc line 













Loss of any element without fault 
Single line to ground fault with loss of two series or parallel 
735 kV line 
Loss of all 735 kV lines emanating from a substation  












Loss of two parallel 735 kV lines and bypass of all series 










Figure 2: Flow chart of rule generation for SPS 
The operation rules of these protection systems are 
complex to establish because of the large number of 
network configurations to be covered as well as the 
great quantity of possible events. The proper level of 
generation rejection and remote load shedding must be 
programmed. Conventionally, the settings of these 
RPTC systems were defined using deterministic 
techniques, which focus on the worst-case scenarios. 
Therefore, it is difficult by the deterministic approach 
to find an optimal level of generator rejection and 
remote load shedding. The approach by the risk 
analysis is a more effective method for the design of 
these rules by ensuring a maximum degree of 
coverage while minimizing the level of action taken 
by RPTC automata.  
 
An example shown in this paper is a study of the 
RPTC system installed at the Churchill Falls 
hydroelectric power plant (5500 MW) in Labrador. 
The purpose of this study is to optimize the settings of 
generation rejection on a particular event. In order to 
extract useful information from the database and to 
cover a sufficiently diverse set of situations, a large 
amount of data cases were retrieved from the database 
where real time power system snapshots are stored. 
Various network states were simulated using power 
system analysis software. These cases represent real 
operating states collected over several years. By using 
the data mining technique  [3]- [6], the most relevant 
parameters for this automatic device will be identified 




The approach is developed to improve operational 
rules of special protection devices used to protect 
Hydro-Québec power system against extreme 
contingencies. Figure 2 illustrates the flow chart of 
this approach designed to create and improve 
operational rules. There are mainly two modules in the 
approach: Database Generation (DG) and Rule 
Generation and Evaluation (RGE). The Database 
Generation takes advantage of in-house data retrieval 
program  [7] which gives the possibility to access a 
database of power system real time snapshots (power 
flow and dynamic data) collected periodically each 
five minutes over a long period of time. After 
choosing a large number of representative samples 
among these real cases, transient stability simulations 
are performed to evaluate the power system behaviour 
under the extreme contingencies. Large amounts of 
results corresponding to these simulations are 
generated and stored for RGE module.  
 
In RGE module, correlation analysis is initially 
performed to eliminate redundancy among the parameters and variables first selected as potentially 
relevant for specified study. An analysis is then performed with the remaining parameters and variables by 
using data mining tools which builds regression trees using the control parameter of the special protection 
system as a goal attribute (for example: number of generator groups to be tripped, level of loads to be shed, 
…). In this way, the more relevant parameters and variables that can be used for the settings of the special 
protection system are identified and positioned at the top of the tree. New simplified regression trees are 
then built in the same way with a limited set of the most relevant parameters and variables chosen from the 
preceding set by the operation planning engineers. Many trees can be built by this process. These trees are 
translated into rules by adjusting thresholds and eliminating some tree nodes. Results of rules are compared 
Figure 1: RPTC system 
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and validated by their precision and degree of coverage for stability. The one rule which gives better 
results is chosen for the special protection system.  
 
This last set of rules is reviewed by the operation planning engineers in charge of these devices and is 
used to elaborate the final set of rules to be implemented in the field. Some considerations (like reliability 
of the relevant parameters or variables inputs or like future addition of new equipment or removal of 
equipment for maintenance, not covered adequately by the data mining process) are then taken into 
account to make some final adjustments to the rules. This final set of rules is then validated with a large 
independent set of real case snapshots by simulation and compared with the rules used in the field. The risk 
level is also evaluated by degree of coverage for stability. If the results are satisfactory for the operation 
planning engineers, then the operation rules are programmed and updated in the control centre. 
 
The construction of decision trees has been achieved by using data mining software  [8]. 
 
3 DATABASE GENERATION 
3.1 Database generation approach 
 
The statistical approach used in this work requires the processing of a very large quantity of results 
generated by numerous scenario simulations. Each scenario is composed of a power flow snapshot of the 
network with the disturbances. The simulations have typically a 10 second time frame and are performed 
on a PC network using an in-house transient stability program. The approach has to generate pessimistic 
scenarios in order to cover adequately the critical situations where the RPTC automatic device operates 
with a good variance on the critical parameters and variables. 
 
Two approaches have been initially envisioned: 
o In the first approach, the generation of scenarios is done from a limited number of power flow base 
cases corresponding to real operating situations. These cases are then modified according to certain 
rules and the corresponding scenarios are simulated in order to create many critical situations for the 
RPTC system.  
o In the second approach, the scenarios are generated from snapshots of real operating cases taken 
periodically over a long period of time (years) and disturbances critical for the RPTC system are 
simulated. 
 
Particular care has to be taken in the data generation process to avoid overrepresentation of non-relevant 
cases.  
 
The results from the first approach are biased due to the overrepresentation of critical situations with in 
fact very low probability. This could be corrected only if probability data are available on disturbances 
and/or operating conditions. Therefore, the second approach, which has been retained in this work, seems 
more appropriate due to the fact that all operating cases used are real and can be selected to cover 
adequately the envisioned power system conditions. 
 
3.2 Database generation program 
 
As shown in Figure 2, an extraction and a conversion of data is first accomplished. The data conversion 
is needed to allow simulations of power system real snapshots stored in the control center database. 
 
For this task, in-house data retrieval program  [7] is used to generate snapshots for planning and 
operation planning engineers. 
 
Control software (pData) was developed to filter snapshot cases in order to keep just the relevant ones 
(cleaning process). For each filtered case, pData software builds the disturbance to be simulated as a 
function of the peculiarities of the studied case.  
 
 In this process, pData associates a random value to certain parameters of the disturbance in order to take 
into account the effects of these variations on the results. These parameters are the fault clearing time 
corresponding to the line re-closing time (breaker operation) and the series compensation by-pass time.  
 
From transient stability simulations, pData determines by an iterative procedure, for each case, the goal 
variable. The goal variable is depending on the type of studies, which could be the minimum number of 
units to be tripped, the amount of loads to be shed, or both. 
 
Finally, pData extracts results and saves some engineering pre-selected relevant parameters and 
4 
variables to simulated database which will be used for Rule Generation and Evaluation. It is important to 
validate the correctness and validity of the data. Any errors in the data will lead to wrong results. Quite 
often, results have to be re-simulated due to missing information or errors. 
4 RULE GENERATION AND EVALUATION 
 
Tree construction is based on data mining techniques. Classification induction methods are used to 
construct decision trees. Based on the information provided by decision trees, rules are generated. 
 
4.1 Data mining technique 
 
Data mining refers to the extraction of high-level synthetic information (knowledge) from databases 
containing large amounts of low-level data. It is also called Knowledge Discovery in Databases (KDD). 
Data mining has received a wide range of applications in recent decades, for example in medical diagnosis, 
in character recognition, as well as in financial and marketing problems. The main reason for the important 
breakthrough is the tremendous increase in computing power. This makes possible the application of the 
often very computationally intensive data mining algorithms to practical large-scale problems. Nowadays, 
data mining techniques are also used in solving power system problems such as security assessment  [3]-
 [5].  
Data mining involves an integration of techniques from multiple disciplines such as database technology, 
statistics, machine learning, high-performance computing, pattern recognition, neural networks and so on. 
Many methods have been developed in the field of data mining. The present paper focuses on using the 
decision/regression tree type methodology to optimize RPTC system rules for generator tripping in the 
context of emergency control at Hydro-Québec. 
 
4.2 Decision/regression trees 
 
A decision tree (DT) is a map of the reasoning process. This data mining technique is able to produce 
classifiers about a given problem in order to deduce information for new, unobserved cases. The DT has 
the hierarchical form of a tree structured upside-down and is built on the basis of a Learning Set (LS). The 
LS comprises a number of cases (objects). Each case consists of pre-classified operating states (described 
by a certain number of parameters called candidate attributes), along with its correct classification (called 
the goal attribute). The candidate attributes characterize the pre-disturbance operating points in terms of 
parameters which can be used to make decisions. The tree building process seeks to build a set of rules 
relating these attributes to the goal attribute, so as to fit the learning set data well enough without over-
fitting this data. The resulting tree is tested on a different data set (test set) where the prediction of the goal 
attribute by these rules is compared with the true class (determined by simulation) for each test case. The 
classification error rate for the test set measures if the method is successful or not. 
 
There are many reasons to use decision trees. The first is their interpretability. A tree structure provides 
the information of how an output is arrived at. Another very important asset is the ability of the method to 
identify among the candidate attributes the most relevant parameters for each problem. A last characteristic 
of decision trees is its computational efficiency. The particular decision/regression tree induction method 
used in this paper is described in details in  [8]. 
 
4.3 Rule evaluation 
 
As mentioned earlier, decision trees can identify the most relevant parameters among the candidate 
attributes. Based on this information, many trees are constructed by selecting different set of relevant 
parameters. These trees are then translated into rules (if else) and put into excel sheets for tuning and 
comparing the performance. Performances of the rules are evaluated by their precision and risk level. The 
precision is measured differences between predicted variables and simulated variables. The risk level is the 
degree of coverage for stability.  
 
Rules given directly by decision trees are unbiased estimates of the true value. Results could lead in 
unstable cases. Therefore, it is necessary to tune the rules in order to eliminate the unstable cases as many 
as possible while maintaining the precision. Tuning process is done by adjusting thresholds for each 
parameters and modifying values at terminal nodes of trees. Some weighting factors can be used to 
penalize the case where the predicted variables are far from simulated variables. If rules are not performed 
well, then the process has to go back to the tree builder to construct more trees. 
 
The risk level is evaluated by the percentage of number of unstable cases given by the rule over total 
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number of cases in the database containing simulation results. High level coverage for stability means high 
percentage of stable cases given by the rule.  
 
The rate of acceptable coverage varies from event to event. It has to consider the consequences and the 
probability of occurrence of studied events. If the event leads to a loss of synchronism for the main grid, a 
high coverage rate will be required. Further more, if this event has already occurred in the past, an even 
higher coverage rate shall be required. On the other hand if the event does not lead to a loss of synchronism 
on the main grid, but to a frequency variation within acceptable limits, a lower coverage rate can be 
accepted. These considerations are qualitative and are based on the judgment and the experience of 
operation planning engineers. Generally, the coverage rate given by the new rule should be higher than the 
existing rule.  
 
5 EXAMPLE 
5.1 Event used for this study 
 
The event used for this study is detected by the RPTC at the 
Churchill Falls substation and is particularly severe for the 
network. The following describes the disturbances: 
 
o Single line to ground fault at the Churchill Falls 
substation; 
o Tripping of two parallel lines between the Churchill Falls 
and Montagnais substations; 
o Bypass of the series compensation bank of the remaining line in the same corridor. 
 
To ensure network security and to avoid an unnecessary generation tripping, the number of generation 
units associated with the generation tripping scheme is adjusted to the loading and the configuration of the 
Churchill Falls – Arnaud corridor (North Shore indicated in Figure 1). Table ii presents the existing rules 
determined by the conventional approach. The margin represents the difference between the maximum 
power transfer considering normal contingencies and the measured power transfer. The table gives the 
number of units to be tripped based on the margin. For example, if the margin is 400 MW and less, then 
tripping of 8 units is required. If the margin is above 2001 MW, then no unit tripping is required. 
 
In this study, a method of analysis based on the 
probabilistic approach will permit: 
 
o To establish the coverage of the current rules; 
o To establish the most sensitive variables that 
affect the network stability for this extreme 
event; 
o To optimize the current rules; 
o To suggest an algorithm to modulate the 
number of generation units to trip. 
 
The methodology used is as follows: 
o Extraction of 10 000 network cases spread 
over several years; 
o Filtering cases to select only ones with 
topologies of 3 lines between Churchill Falls 
and Montagnais. 4600 cases are remaining; 
o Creation of each case with a random fault duration and a random time of bypassing a capacitor;  
o About 13 000 stability simulations were performed to find the minimum number of units to be 
tripped to ensure system stability after this event for each remaining cases, and some 236 variables 
are pre-selected and saved for the database used in the data mining;  
o Optimization of the number of units to be tripped with a decision tree. 
 
5.2 Correlation studies 
 
Using the generated database, correlation studies were performed. Figure 3 shows the correlation of 
transfer and transfer margin on the Churchill Falls corridor vs minimum generator unit tripping as 
determined by the time-domain simulations. The dashed horizontal line in Figure 3 shows, for example, 
that the currently used-rules require to trip 8 units if the transfer margin on the Churchill Falls corridor is 
Table ii: Generator unit tripping scheme
Modulation: 3 links at Churchill Falls 
Margin At Churchill Falls: Units to be tripped 
400 MW and less 8 
401 to 700 MW 7 
701 to 1000 MW 6 
1001 to 1200 MW 5 
1201 to 1400 MW 4 
1401 to 1600 MW 3 
1601 to 1800 MW 2 
1801 to 2000 MW 1 
2001 MW and more 0 
Table iii: Statistical data of unnecessary tripped 
units from the generated database 



















8 2130 205 1925 5643 2.65 33 
7 647 93 554 1818 2.81 40 
6 626 15 611 2288 3.65 61 
5 135 0 135 625 4.62 93 
4 278 0 278 1047 3.77 94 
3 159 0 159 477 3.00 100 
2 157 0 157 314 2.00 100 
1 58 0 58 58 1.00 100 
0 370 370 0 0 0.00 0 
Total 4560 683 3877 12270 2.70 44 
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less than 400 MW (see Table 
ii). From the generated 
database (4560 cases), there 
are about 2130 cases (see 
Table iii) in which the current 
rules require 8 units to be 
tripped, but actually, we can 
see from Figure 3 that if the 
transfer on the Churchill Falls 
corridor is less than 3300 MW 
(dashed vertical line), there is 
no need to trip generator units 
at all. If we count the number 
of cases for which the time 
domain simulations determine 
it is necessary to trip 8 units, 
we find only 205 cases. Thus, 
among the 2130 cases for 
which the current rules tell us 
to trip 8 units, there are 1925 
cases which need less than 
eight (down to zero) unit 
tripping. More synthetically, if 
we count among these 2130 cases the difference between the number of units required to trip by the current 
rules and the actual number of units necessary to be tripped according to the simulations, it is found that 
33% of generator units (5643 units) are unnecessarily tripped with the currently used 8 units tripping rules. 
 
Table iii shows some other statistical data from the generated database. It can be observed that among 
4560 cases the average of generator units over-tripped is about 2.70 per case and 44% of generator units 
are over-tripped. From this, it can be seen that the current rules are highly conservative and could possibly 
be improved by taking into account not only the margin but also the total power transfer through the 
Churchill Falls corridor in their formulation. 
 
5.3 Regression tree 
 
Constructions of 
regression trees were 
carried out on the 
generated database. 
Among 4560 objects 
(cases), 2000 objects 
were selected as a 
learning set and the 
remaining 2560 objects 
were comprised as a test 
set. The goal is to predict 
the minimum number of 
generator units to be 
tripped. Figure 4 shows 
a constructed regression 
tree. The tree is to read 
top-down: each internal 
node corresponds to a 
test on one of the 
candidate attributes and 
the terminal nodes correspond to decisions about the number of units to be tripped. These nodes are sorted 
left to right by increasing number of units to be tripped. For example the left-most terminal node (denoted 
T4) corresponds to 600 cases for which the expected number of units to be tripped is 0.04167. A case will 
be directed to this node if T_CHU_MONT < 3899 MW. On the other hand, the right-most terminal node 
(denoted T33) corresponds to an expected number of units to be tripped of 7.032 with the following 4 
conditions: 
 
1) The transfer on the Churchill Fall Corridors T_CHU_MONT > 4349 MW; 
2) The transfer margin on the Churchill Falls corridor Mar_Chu_Mont_Corr < 504 MW; 


















Zero Unit Tripping One-Eight Unit Tripping
Figure 3: Correlation of transfer and margin at Churchill Falls corridor 
400 MW 
3300 MW 
Figure 4: Regression tree to predict number of generator unit tripping
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3) The spinning reserve at the Churchill fall Reserve_Chu < 564 MW; 
4) The voltage at the Churchill Falls KV_CHU735 < 737 kV. 
 
Notice that among the 236 candidate attributes proposed to the tree building software, only 8 attributes 
were identified as important variables to decide on the number of units to be tripped. Notice also that in 
order to translate the rules provided by the tree into decision rules it is obviously necessary to convert the 
fractional predictions into integer numbers (e.g. by rounding up to the nearest larger integer value – ceiling 
function). 
 
By construction, the predictions of the regression tree 
are unbiased estimates of the true values; this means that 
their errors are both negative and positive. In practice, it 
may be preferable to have rules that have less negative 
errors (too few unit tripping – under-tripping) than 
positive ones (too many – over-tripping) because the cost 
of instability is much higher than the cost of unnecessarily tripping one or two more units. Such a bias can 
be introduced as a post-processing of the regression tree output, for example by adding some positive 
constant to its predictions before rounding up to the nearest integer. 
 
5.4 New Rules 
 
Although the regression tree gives much better 
results over the existing rules (see in section  5.5), the 
under-tripping rate is still too high and cannot be 
accepted by operation planning engineers. From the 
regression tree, it is observed that some important 
variables appear on the tree such as the transfer 
margin on the Churchill Falls corridor and the 
spinning reserve at Churchill Falls generation station. 
The new rules based on these two variables are 
established and shown in Table v. The new rules can 
also be illustrated in Figure 5. The reason to choose 
the margin and spinning reserve is that the margin 
represents two variables: transfer and limit which 
implies the network topology, while the spinning 
reserve represents both the number of generators on 
line and the amount of power generated in the plant. It 
is also believed that rules expressed in terms of these 
two variables are more relevant for operation planning 
engineers since they should be more robust with 
respect to future addition of new equipments or 
removal of equipments for maintenance. 
 
5.5 Comparison of results 
 
Table iv lists the average of over-tripped units per 
case. Although this value may not have a direct 
physical meaning, it is used here as an indication of 
the improvement of the different methods tested. The 
first line of the table refers to the rules actually in use, 
and designed by the classical deterministic method. 
The second line gives the results obtained by rules of a 
post-processing of the regression tree of Figure 4. 
Third line gives the performance of the new rules 
designed by hand from taking into account both margin and spinning reserve at the Churchill Falls power 
plant. The post-processing consists in adding a positive bias of 0.45 to the predictions of the tree and round 
up to the nearest integer (ceiling function). It can be seen that the regression tree has the least average 
value of over-tripped generator units per case. This means that if the regression tree rules are implemented, 
the number of generator unit tripping will be closest to their minimum among all other methods. 
 
Figure 6 shows the frequency diagram of mis-tripped generator units for different methods. The term of 
“mis-tripped” unit is defined as the difference between simulated optimal unit tripping and the number of 
units tripping prescribed by a rule. A positive value means generator units are over-tripped while negative 
value means under-tripped with respect to the value determined by simulations. From this diagram, one can 
Table iv: Average of over-tripped units per case 
Methods Used Average
Current Rules 2.70 
Regression Tree with Post-processing 1.08 
New Rules with two variables 1.62 
Table v: The new rules combining two variables 
Rules for spinning 
reserve at Churchill 
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Figure 5: New rules combining two variables 
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observe that the distribution of mis-tripped units by the current rules is widely spread while that of the 
regression tree is concentrated. In most cases, the regression tree gives one generator unit over-tripping 
while the current rules sometimes gives 8 generator units over-tripping. The reason that the regression tree 
mis-tripping is concentrated around one is, as mentioned previously, that the post-processing is applied to 
the regression tree of Figure 4. This post-processing adds a positive value of 0.45 to the predictions of the 
tree before applying the ceiling function in order to eliminate most of the generator unit under-tripping. 
Therefore, it appears that in most cases the regression tree settles on one generator unit over-tripping. The 
results from the regression tree are very promising, but more efforts have to be made to eliminate under-
tripping cases. 
 
The new rules combining two variables further eliminate the under-tripping cases. Despite it sacrifices 
the accuracy of generator tripping; the results are more reliable and acceptable by operation planning 
engineers. It also reduces the error of over-tripping cases. Furthermore, the new rules are quite simple and 




A new approach to improve settings of special 
protection devices used to protect Hydro-Québec 
power system against extreme contingencies has 
been introduced. This approach applies data mining 
technique to real case snapshots of Hydro-Quebec 
power system in a probabilistic way.  
 
This approach is illustrated here with a detailed 
description of its application to an emergency 
control automat, the RPTC SPS device installed at 
the Churchill Falls hydroelectric power station (5500 
MW) in Labrador. The data mining technique was applied to the results of some 13 000 network 
simulations. Various network states were taken from a real-time database and were simulated using power 
system analysis software. The data cases represent actual operating states collected over several years. By 
using the data mining technique, the most relevant parameters for this automat were identified and 
effective settings were determined. 
 
A correlation analysis and the construction of regression trees were carried out on the results of these 
simulations using data mining software. This analysis made it possible to minimize, in particular, the 
number of generators tripped by the RPTC system for a large number of network conditions, while 
maintaining the same performance in terms of security coverage. New operation rules can thus be 
established by operation planning engineers and will be implemented. 
 
Following these very encouraging results, other applications of these methods are being considered at 
Hydro-Québec in the coming years. 
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Figure 6: Comparison of results of different 
methods
